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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages for the defendant's 
alleged tortious interference with the business relations of 
tlic plaintiffs arising out of defendant's actions in termi-
,,~ing a financing arrangement with the plaintiff Globe; 
sending a notice of assignment of leases to the lessees of 
the plaintiff Globe; and dishonoring three checks drawn by 
Globe on its account with defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment 
for the plaintiff Globe Leasing and a dismissal of defendant's 
counterclaims, defendant appeals. The court below found no 
cause of action for plaintiffs Alfred B. Weigelt and Gloria 
Morrison Weigelt and dismissed all claims against individual 
defendant, Norton Parker. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and 
Judgment in its favor as a matter of law on the question of 
its liability, or that failing, a new trial on the question 
of liability. Alternatively, defendant seeks reversal of 
Lhe award of damages to plaintiff and the denial of any 
awctrd of damages to plaintiff as a matter of law, or that 
'-·
1 iling, 0. new trial on the issue of damages. Finally, and 
·: ; 1 t 1 ''" to the foregoing, defendant seeks the reversal 
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of the judgment of dismissal on its counterclaims and judg-
ment in its favor with an appropriate award of damages on 
those counterclaims which are addressed in argument here-
after, as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial on 
the counterclaims of the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The actions of Appellant, Commercial Security Bank 
of Salt Lake (the Bank) complained of by Appellee, Globe 
Leasing Corporation (Globe) occurred in and around July of 
1974. (Tr Vol. 1 at 47-59) Specifically, on or about 
July 15, 1974, the Bank mailed letters to persons or entities 
who had leased automobiles from Globe. (Tr Vol. 1 at 4 7-48; 
Vol. 2 at 98-102) The letters so sent informed the respec-
tive lessees of Globe that Globe had assigned the lessee's 
lease to the Bank and, further, that the Bank was now re-
questing that any further rental payments be made directly 
to the Bank instead of to Globe. (Exhibit 9-P) Also on 
July 15, 1974, pursuant to the instructions of Mr. Norton 
Parker, the then President of the Bank, the Bank determined 
to terminate further extension of credit to Globe for its 
automobile leases. (Tr Vol. 1 at 49-50) At or about this 
same time, Mr. Parker was informed that there were in house, 
or in process, three additional leases of Globe for which 
funds by the Bank had not yet been advanced. (Tr Vol. 1 at 
-2-
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51-52; Vol. 2 at 106-108) After a discussion with Mr. Al-
fred B. Weigelt, the principal owner and chief executive 
officer of Globe, the only other employee being his wife 
Gloria, Mr. Parker determined to honor the Bank's commitment 
to extend financing for those last three leases. (Tr Vol. 1 
at 54, 133-134; Vol. 2 at 106-108) After having instructed 
bank employees to continue processing those three leases, 
Mr. Parker discovered that, contrary to his past experience 
or practice in such matters, the Bank had issued credit ad-
vices to the account of Globe in the amount of the sums ad-
vanced to Globe for the purchase of the automobiles which 
were to be subject of the three leases. (Tr Vol. 2 at 129-
132) Because of a previous experience with one Naylor auto 
in which it was apparent that the funds credited to Globe 
for the purchase of an automobile subject to a lease being 
financed by the Bank, had not been used to purchase that 
automobile, Mr. Parker wishing to insure that that situation 
would not again arise, ordered that the credit advices to 
Globe's account be reversed. (Tr Vol. 2 at 129-130) Upon 
receipt of notice of the said credit advices, Globe drew 
checks for the purchase of the three automobiles subject to 
the leases for which funds had been advanced by the Bank. 
(Tr Vol. 1 at 52; Vol. 2 at 130-131) The automobile dealers 
-3-
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to whom those three checks were issued brought the checks in 
person to the Bank to have them cashed. (Tr Vol. 1 at 128-
129) Because the credit advices had been reversed at the 
direction of Mr. Parker, the said automobile dealers were 
informed that the checks would not be honored by the Bank. 
Mr. Parker attempted to arrange for an alternate method of 
advancing the funds on the final three leases. He caused 
three cashier's checks to be issued in the name of Globe 
and the respective dealer from whom the automobile would be 
purchased. Globe was then notified that those checks were 
available at the Bank and could be picked up for use in pay-
ment for the three automobiles. Globe refused to receive 
the funds advanced to it by the Bank in that form and subse-
quently, through negotiations between the two parties, a 
method of payment was agreed upon and checks drawn by Globe 
to the three dealers were honored. (Tr Vol. 1 at 52-55, 
132-134; Vol. 2 at 131) 
On or about July 17, 1974 the Bank notified Globe 
by telegram that it would no longer extend credit to Globe. 
(Exhibit 30-D) 
For an understanding of the context in which the 
actions of the Bank on or about July 15, 16 and 17 of 1974, 
took place, it is necessary to provide some history and 
background of the relationship between the Bank and Globe 
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1xior to that time. The relationship had its beginning some-
time in July of 1973 barely a year before the events which 
gave rise to this lawsuit. Mr. Weigelt, seeking financing 
for a proposed automobile leasing company which would later 
become Globe, came to the Bank at that time in 1973 to make 
a presentation. (Tr Vol. 1 at 3-5) It appears that Mr. 
Weigelt's contact with the Bank was principally through 
Mr. James W. Perry, at that time employed by the Bank as a 
Vice President in the consumer loan area. (Tr Vol. 1 at 3-
11; Vol. 2 at 15-16) The record as to the sequence of events 
at that time is less than clear, however, it appears that 
Mr. Weigelt also had the opportunity to make a presentation 
of some kind to other officers of the Bank. (Tr Vol. 1 at 
8-9) In any event, the result of Mr. Weigelt's solicitations 
was that his proposal was presented to the loan committee of 
the Bank which determined to turn down his application for 
financing. (Tr Vol. 2 at 15-16) 
Shortly after the meeting of the loan committee at 
which Globe's application for financing was denied, Mr. 
Parker spoke with Mr. Perry concerning the Globe proposal. 
ht that time, Mr. Parker instructed Mr. Perry to "try a few" 
of the Globe leases. (Tr Vol. 2 at 16-17) It also appears, 
that Mr. Parker told Mr. Perry that he should try a few 
lea~e~ up to a limit of about $30,000 or $40,000. (Tr Vol. 
-5-
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2 at 43-44) Pursuant to that discussion, Mr. Perry sent a 
letter to Mr. Weigelt purporting to confirm an agreement 
entered into between Globe and the Bank. In that letter, 
Mr. Perry informed Mr. Weigelt that: 
This agreement covers the assignment of lease 
contracts to this bank from time to time as 
generated through your normal business acti-
vities, and will remain in force until written 
notice is received by either party to effect 
the termination. 
(Exhibit 8-P) That letter from Mr. Perry apparently began 
a series of transactions between Globe and the Bank on some 
64 motor vehicle leases generated by Globe. (Exhibit 17-P) 
The apparent procedure used in effecting those 
transactions was as follows: Globe as an automobile leasing 
company would locate prospective lessees. Globe would make 
its own credit check of the prospective lessee and provide 
the Bank with credit information necessary for the Bank to 
complete its own independent credit check of the prospective 
lessee. After approval by the Bank, both of the credit of 
the prospective lessee and the amount to be advanced by the 
Bank on the lease, Globe would apparently complete the 
lease transaction by ordering the car subject of the lease, 
execute the lease, execute a motor vehicle security agree-
ment with the Bank as secured party, and execute an assignment 
of the lease. The lease, lease assignment and security 
agreement would then be forwarded to the Bank at which time 
-6-
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a credit advice in the amount to be advanced on the lease 
would be issued by the Bank to the account of Globe. (Ex-
hibit 17-P) The Bank apparently set up the accounting for 
the transactions with Globe on a main computer account with 
Globe as the "dealer" and with each of the individual leases 
which had been assigned to the Bank on a separate sub-ac-
count. (Tr Vol. 1 at 11-26; Vol. 2 at 19-42) Each month, 
the Bank would debit Globe's operating account with the Bank 
for the sums owing on each of the lease accounts. 
There were some exceptions to the above mode of 
effectuating the lease and lease assignment transaction be-
tween Globe and the Bank. Although originally the amount of 
the funds which Globe requested that the Bank advance on 
each lease was in the amount of the purchase price of the 
automobile subject to the lease, Globe changed that practice 
and began requesting the amount of the purchase price of the 
automobile plus 10% additional. (Tr Vol. 1 at 12-13, 41-42; 
Vol 2. at 57, 123) In one specific instance, Globe received 
as the proceeds of the loan on a lease to Donald L. Hildreth 
the sum of $8, 546. 41. The lease which was assigned by 
Globe to the Bank in exchange for the advance of the funds 
was not in fact a valid lease as the signature of Mr. 
HildLeth had been forged thereon. (Tr Vol. 1 at 42-47, 66, 
8~-10~. 146-156) There had been, in fact, a lease of an 
-7-
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automobile to Mr. Hildreth by Globe. However, the lease of 
said automobile to Mr. Hildreth was not upon the same terms 
as those represented in the lease with the forged signature 
which was assigned to the Bank by Globe. (Exhibit 26-D) 
(Tr Vol. l at 92). The actual lease between Globe and Mr. 
Hildreth provided for a prepayment of the rentals on that 
lease in the sum of $3,500.00. (Tr Vol. l at 92-94) Each 
assignment of lease executed by Globe to the Bank contained 
a provision prohibiting such prepayment without the written 
consent and authorization of the Bank. (Exhibit 20-P) 
Neither the prepayments nor any sums received in payment 
for the purchase of the automobile were paid to the Bank 
at the time of their receipt by Globe. Rather, Globe al-
lowed the Bank to continue to debit its account in accor-
dance with the lease payment terms of the lease which had 
been given to the Bank. (Tr Vol. l at 100) 
Another instance of departure from the procedure 
above described, was an instance in which Globe received 
funds from the Bank for the purchase of a 1974 Pontiac sub-
ject to a lease which was to be assigned to the Bank. Con-
trary to the terms of the Motor Vehicle Security Agreement 
given to the Bank in conjunction with the lease assign-
ment of that Pontiac, Globe had, in fact, previously re-
ceived a loan for the purchase of that same automobile from 
-8-
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valley Bank & Trust Company and had granted to Valley Bank & 
Trust Company a security interest in the same vehicle. Upon 
discovery of this instance of double financing, and in order 
to m~ke good its security interest in the automobile, the 
Bank paid to Valley Bank & Trust Company the sum of $3,165.95. 
(Tr Vol. 1 at 111-115; Vol. 2 at 158-160) 
In a further departure from the established proce-
dure which departure was a major factor in the actions taken 
by the Bank at the direction of Mr. Parker on July 15, 1974, 
Globe obtained the approval of Mr. Perry on one lease to a 
company called Leisureamerica. However, fourteen other 
leases to that same company were processed by the Bank ap-
parently without the knowledge or approval of Mr. Perry. 
(Tr Vol. 1 at 116-118; Vol. 2 at 66-75, 110) Leisureamerica 
Company was, in fact, a very bad credit risk. Just prior to 
July 15, 1974, Mr. Perry was on vacation. During the period 
of Mr. Perry's absence, Mr. Parker had occasion to make in-
quiry concerning the relationship of the Bank with Globe. 
(Tr Vol. 2 at 96-98) He discovered that instead of a total 
sum of $30,000 to $40,000 in leases, the Bank had advanced 
in excess of $390,000 on Globe leases and Mr. Parker there-
upon began an irrunediate investigation of the files re-
latinq to Globe. In the process of such investigation, he 
d1 ,crprJ the leases to Leisureamerica. (Tr Vol. 2 at 
-9-
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96-98) 
Globe began operations sometime in July of 1973. 
At that time, because of the letter from Mr. Perry to Mr. 
Weigelt, Globe, a previously non-existent entity began opera-
tion as a Utah corporation. Previous to the time of the 
Bank's indication that it was willing to advance funds for 
the leasing operation contemplated by Mr. Weigelt, Globe had 
been unable to begin operation as a result of Mr. Weigelt's 
inability to obtain financing from any other banking insti-
tu ti on. (Tr Vol. 1 at 122-123) This failure was not with-
standing the considerable efforts of Mr. Weigelt in making 
presentations at a number of other institutions in the corn-
munity. Globe was capitalized for only about $3,000.00. 
(Tr Vol. 1 at 120, 219) On that capitalization, Globe pro-
ceeded to generate over $390,000 in outstanding leases. (Tr 
Vol. 1 at 219) Then, one year after the initiation of the 
relationship between the Bank and Globe (Tr Vol. 1 at 219), 
the latter failed to obtain alternate financing and closed 
its business with the exception of operating as a broker for 
some six leases later in 1974. (Tr Vol. 1 at 216-218) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT 
DO NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT 
APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
WITH THE BUSINESS RELATIONS OF THE APPELLEE. 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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In Mason v. Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730 
(1945) the court held, citing earlier Utah cases: 
"It is fundamental that the conclusions 
of law must be predicated upon and find 
their support in the findings of fact, and 
the judgment must follow the conclusions of 
law" and if the conclusions are at variance 
with the findings, the Supreme Court will 
order the lower court to set aside its er-
roneous conclusions and substitute correct 
ones therefor . • . . A judgment in confor-
mity with the findings will not be disturbed. 
And, of course, the converse is true. A 
judgment not in conformity with the find-
ings cannot be permitted to stand. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 732. That fundamental proposition has applicability 
in the review of the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, which resulted in a judgment of liability against Ap-
pellant, Commercial Security Bank of Salt Lake ("Bank") in 
this case. 
In paragraph 1 of the Conclusions of Law, the 
court states: 
The acts of defendant Bank of Salt 
Lake outlined in the First, Second, Third, 
and Fifth Causes of Action constitute a 
tortious interference by the Bank of Salt 
Lake in the business activities of Globe 
Leasing, and all four causes are deemed 
merged. (Emphasis added.) 
The findings of fact entered by the court do not support the 
conclusion that there was "tortious interference" by the 
Bank. The substance of the relevant findings made by the 
-11-
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court is that: 
1. The Bank extended credit to the Appellee, 
Globe Leasing ("Globe"), to finance leases generated by 
Globe; 
2. The credit was extended pursuant to an agree-
ment evidence:lby a letter signed by an officer of the Bank, 
James W. Perry; 
3. Certain security devices were employed to 
secure credit extended, such devices including an assignment 
of each and every lease generated with funds advanced by 
the Bank; 
4. On or about July 15, 1974, the Bank "commenced 
dishonoring" Globe's checks, terminated the line of credit 
(notification of the same was given by telegram July 17, 
1974), directed letters to all of Globe Leasing's lessees re-
questing that payment be made to the Bank on the leases, and 
impounded funds in Globe's accounts at the Bank;!/ 
5. The above actions caused damage to Globe. 
The holding of the trial court was simply that be-
cause the Bank had dishonored checks (for whatever reason, 
justified or not), sent letters to lessees directing that 
lease payments be made to the Bank instead of to Globe 
1/ There is no allegation in the First, Second, Third, and 
Fifth Causes of Action concerning the impoundment of funds by 
the Bank. 
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(whether or not a right to do so existed in the assignment 
agreement and under the applicable provisions of Utah law) and 
terminated further financing (whether or not a right to so 
terminate was included in the financing agreement), the Bank 
tortiously interfered in the business relations of Globe. 
Under no theory of tortious interference would the general 
factual finding of the above actions by a defendant be suffi-
cient to establish a finding of tortious interference with 
business relations. 
One of the theories advanced by Globe as a basis 
for the liability of the Bank is that of slander of credit 
or libel of business. One prominent commentator has charac-
terized this theory of tortious interference as "injurious 
falsehood" or "disparagement".'!:./ In sununarizing the elements 
of tortious interference, that same authority states: 
The cause of action . . resembles 
that for defamation, but differs from it ma-
teriall in the greater burden of proof rest-
ing on t e p ainti an t e necessity or 
special damage in all cases. The falsehood 
must be communicated to a third person, since 
the tort consists of interference with t~ 
relation with such persons. But the plaintiff 
must plead and prove not only the publication 
and its disparaging innuendo, as in defama-
tion, but something more. There is no pre-
sumption, as in the case of slander, that the 
disparaging statement is false, and the 
I~~.--C:--Pr05Ser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §128 at 919 
'4th r_>J. 1971). 
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2laintiff must establish its falsity as a 
part of his cause of action. (Emphasis 
added.) 
W. L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §128 at 920 
(4th ed. 1971). Utah law comports with this general state-
ment of the elements of the cause of action. Accord, ~ 
v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 291, 265, P.2d 644 (1954) and 
Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 
415 P.2d 316, 318 (1966). The court made no finding of fact 
that any statement or publication or action constituting a 
statement or publication of the Bank was disparaging or was 
false as applied to Globe. 
Another form of tortious interference which is 
generally recognized is that of interference with contractual 
relations. Obviously, an element of that cause of action is 
interference with some existing contractual relationship of 
the plaintiff. Specifically, the action is for inducing a 
party to breach a contract with the plaintiff. There was no 
evidence and no finding of fact by the trial court that any 
party with whom Globe had an existing contractual relation-
ship was induced to breach such a contract. The fact, if the 
court had so found, that lessees made lease payments, pur-
suant to notice, directly to the Bank rather than to Globe 
is no showing of a breach of contract with Globe on the part 
of the lessees. 
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Further, the law concerning liability for inducing 
a breach of contract includes the opportunity for a defendant 
tn plead and prove an absolute privilege for taking the ac-
tion complained of by the plaintiff. See Bunnell v. Bills, 
13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 597, 602-03 (1962) and Ganunon v. 
Federated Milk Producers Ass'n., 11 Utah 2d 421, 426, 360 P.2d 
1018, 1022 (1961). The record contains ample evidence of the 
existence of such a privilege for the Bank pursuant to the 
terms of the assignment agreements. The undisputed facts and 
law relating to such rights will be discussed more completely 
hereinafter. Notwithstanding, the factual findings of the 
trial court are absolutely devoid of any statement that the 
Bank was not privileged to take the actions which it did. 
The conclusion that liability exists for tortious interference 
on the basis of those actions is, therefore, faulty and must 
be reversed with directions to enter a conclusion of law to 
the contrary. 
Globe may, however, argue that there is implied in 
the findings of fact, as presently constituted, a finding 
that no absolute privilege existed. Because evidence on 
the issue of privilege was presented at trial, a finding of 
liability by the trial court impliedly negates the existence, 
in fact, of any such privilege. However, the established 
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law in our state has been announced as follows: 
We are at a loss to understand why no 
findings of fact were made in the instant 
case. The right to resort to the courts 
for the adjudication of grievances and the 
settlement of disputes is a fundamental and 
important one! An indispensable requisite 
to fulfilling that responsibility is the 
determination of questions of fact uton 
which there is disagreement. It isor this 
reason that our rules impose the duty of 
making findings on all material issues. 
Rule 52 U.R.C.P. provides that: "In all 
actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
*** the court shall unless the same are 
waived, find the facts specially and state 
separately the conclusions of law thereon." 
In Baker v. Hatch, the court declared: 
*** It is the duty of the trial court to 
find upon all issues raised by the plead-
ings, and the failure to do so is reversible 
error. {Citing authorities] (Emphasis 
added.) 
Legrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 
P.2d 615, 616 (1966). The trial court has not "found the 
facts specially" upon the issue of privilege. There is, 
therefore, reversible error in this case. 
The rationale announced in Peterson, supra, for 
making findings on all disputed issues is sound policy. 
Without specific findings upon disputed issues, the parties 
and others who rely upon the judgment of the court to guide 
their later actions are left to speculate upon the nature 
of the applicable law. 
Likewise, if the judgment in this case is allowed 
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to stand, it will appear that the court has ruled that the 
Bank is strictly liable for the demise of any business whose 
financing, pursuant to agreement, it terminates especially 
where it exercises its rights in agreements and relationships 
connected thereto. That certainly cannot be and is not the 
law and the Bank and others should not be required to act in 
accordance therewith now or in the future. 
Finally, some additional conunents must be addressed 
to the most amorphous form of the cause of action for tor-
tious interference, "interference with prospective advantage." 
As with the cause of action for inducing a breach of con-
tract, the actions which interfere must not be privileged 
actions. 
No case has been found in which in-
tended but purely incidental interference 
resulting from the pursuit of the de-
fendant's own ends by proper means has been 
held actionable. 
W. L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §130 at 952 
(4th ed. 1971). As has already been discussed, the court 
made no finding of fact that the actions of the Bank were 
not pursuant to legal rights, contractual, statutory, or 
otherwise, and, therefore, not privileged. In the face of 
ample evidence of the existence of such rights and privi-
lege, the statement of liability in paragraph 1 of the Con-
clnsion.s of Law must be reversed. 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION 
OF LAW THAT APPELLANT TORTIOUSLY INTERFERED 
WITH THE BUSINESS RELATIONS OF THE APPELLEE. 
A careful examination of the trial court record re-
veals the reason why that court failed to make the specific 
findings of material fact issues necessary to the conclu-
sion of law that the Bank is liable for tortious interfer-
ence, i.e., no such findings could be made on the evidence 
presented in the record because there was no substantial 
evidence to support such findings. 
A. THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE FALSITY OF ANY 
INNUENDO TO BE DRAWN FROM THE ACTIONS OF APPELLANT. 
There was no substantial evidence that any dis-
paraging innuendo which might have been drawn from the ac-
tions of the Bank was, in fact, false. All of the evidence 
in the record is to the contrary. The only "scintilla" of 
evidence which was introduced by Globe which would tend to 
show its creditworthiness was testimony by various witnesses 
that the Bank's computer runs showed no payment delinquen-
cies from Globe to the Bank. That evidence is without any 
substantiality in light of undisputed evidence that Globe's 
currency on its loan accounts with the Bank for the brief 
period of its operation, are explained by the fact that 
Globe used a prepayment on one lease and security deposits, 
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tor which later refund or other use would be required, to 
pay its current liabilities. In other words, the evidence 
was that Globe may only have been staying current by using 
funds obtained in the present which were already subject to 
future commitment or which were actually held on behalf of 
lessees. This, added to the undisputed evidence of double-
financing (Tr Vol. 1 at 111-115), the issuance of a forged 
lease to obtain loaned funds (Tr Vol. 1 at 42-47, 66, 89-104, 
146-156), and the thin capitalization of the corporation 
(Tr Vol. 1 at 120, 219), establish without any contrary evi-
dence, that any innuendo of lack of creditworthiness was 
founded in truth and could not possibly constitute a libel 
or slander of Globe's credit or business. 
B, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT WAS WITHOUT THE 
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE TO ACT AS IT DID IN EVERY INSTANCE. 
There is no evidence in the record to support a 
finding that the actions taken by the Bank were wrongful or 
contrary to contractual and statutory rights. The Bank had 
the legal right to take each action. The Bank's termina-
tion of any further financing to Globe was pursuant to the 
undisputed contractual right to do so. (Exhibit 8-P) That 
the exercise of the right of termination pursuant to the 
terms of a contract may be taken, is a clearly established 
proposition of law. See, Flinco, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and 
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Rubber Company, 17 Utah 2d 173, 406 P.2d 911 (1965). The 
Bank gave oral notice of termination of further credit ad-
vances. Thereafter, proper written notification of termina-
tion was given by telegram. (Exhibit 30-D) 
Secondly, the terms of the assignment of lease 
which was used in every instance, places no condition upon 
the right of the assignee, Bank, to give notice to the les-
sees to make payment directly to the Bank. The language of 
each assignment is unequivocal (Exhibit 20-P): 
For like consideration and said Bank of 
Salt Lake is authorized and empowered to 
collect all sums of money presently due-or 
that at any time hereafter may become due and 
owing as rental under the provisions of said 
lease and to receipt thereof, as fully and 
completely and for all purposes as the under-
signed [Globe] might, or could, have done 
had this assignment not been made and given. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Globe has argued that because, as the further language indi-
cates, the assignment of rentals is made "as and for col-
lateral security," that any direct rental collection by the 
Bank was conditioned upon the occurrence of a default in 
payment of sums owing the Bank. There is no evidence to 
support that restrictive construction of the agreement and 
even the trial court found differently, albeit, as will be 
shown below, not in accord with the law. The trial court 
found in paragraph 4 of its findings of fact that the Bank's 
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right to collect rentals was simply conditioned upon "de-
fault" by Globe. 
There is no evidence to support the imposition of 
any condition on the Bank's rights to collect rentals. Not-
withstanding an assignment of lease payments for "collateral," 
direct collection by the secured party can be made without 
any condition of default. In §70A-9-502(1) of the Utah 
code Annotated it is provided that: 
When so agreed and in any event on de-
fault the secured party is entitled to notify 
an account debtor or the obligor on an in-
strument to make payment to him whether or 
not the assignor was theretofore making col-
lection on the collateral . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Where there is ambiguity in the terms of a written 
agreement, the well-established rule of law is that "in case 
of doubt or ambiguity a contract will be construed most 
strongly against the party who drew or prepared it 
See 17 Am Jur 2d §276 at 690; Accord, Bryant v. Deseret 
News Publishing Co., 233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951). Accordingly, 
whatever ambiguity exists in the lease assignments as to the 
existence and content of any condition precedent to direct 
collection of rental payments by the Bank must be construed 
in favor of the Bank since the undisputed evidence is that 
the assignment agreement was a document drafted by and pro-
'vided b/ Gluue. Accordingly, in light of the unequivocal 
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language of the assignments, quoted above, giving the Bank 
authorization and power for collection and receipt of rentals, 
the conclusion of the trial court that a condition precedent 
to collection existed is contrary to law and the facts. The 
construction most favorable to the Bank, justified by the as-
signment agreement on its face, is that part of the collat-
eral security afforded under the agreement to the Bank is the 
unconditional right at any time to collect payments directly 
from the lessees. 
Even if there were some condition precedent to the 
Bank's collection rignt, a fair and reasonable construction 
of the condition would necessarily be broader than default 
in "payments" to the Bank by Globe. The court found the 
condition to be "plaintiff's default." As evidenced by the 
language of the Motor VehiclE Security Agreements executed 
in conjunction with the leases assigned to the Bank, "default" 
is a broad term which can include the secured party "deeming 
itself to be insecure for any reason whatsoever." Speci-
fically, §?OA-1-208, of Utah Code Annotated, provides as 
follows: 
A term providing that one party or his suc-
cessor in interest may accelerate payment 
or performance or require collateral or 
additional collateral "at will" or "when he 
deems himself insecure" or words of similar 
import shall be construed to mean that he 
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shall have power to do so only if he in good 
faith believes that the prospect of payment 
or performance is impaired. The burden of 
establishing lack of good faith is upon the 
party against whom the power has been exer-
cised. (Emphasis added.) 
The undisputed evidence is that Mr. Norton Parker, 
the Bank's president, took action to notify lessees to make 
payments to the Bank for several reasons including the exis-
tence of leases to Leisureamerica, an entity of doubtful 
creditworthiness. (Tr Vol. 2 at 97, 125-126) The existence 
of fifteen or so bad leases appearing to have no proper 
Bank authorization would constitute an event of default and 
certainly justify a good faith belief that the prospects of 
payment or performance were impaired. In any event, there 
was an absolute absence of any evidence by Globe tending to 
show any "lack of good faith" by the Bank in its belief of 
some insecurity with respect to Globe. In fact, the evi-
dence was that Mr. Parker believed that Globe had been 
making payoffs to someone at the Bank in exchange for the 
credit advances. (Tr Vol. 1 at 50) All of the evidence 
before the court justified such a belief since the thirty 
to forty thousand dollar cap which he had given Mr. Perry 
was exceeded almost twelve-fold and since a number of 
doubtful leases to Leisurearnerica appeared to have been 
processed without appropriate approval. (Tr Vol. 2 at 126) 
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Because there was a "default," the notices sent by the Bank 
to the lessees were in strict compliance with its rights 
under the assignment agreement and pursuant to collection 
rights afforded under §70A-9-502(1), Utah Code Annotated. 
No liability for tortious interference can arise from no-
tices given in accordance with contractual and statutory 
rights. In a case directly on point, this court so held. 
{A] creditor who has a security interest in 
personal property has a right to notify any 
third party of his interest; and doing so 
does not constitute an actionable interference 
with the debtor's business. 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 
567 (1974). In that case, defendant Wright had assigned 
certain proceeds from crops to First Security to secure a 
loan. Certain of those crops had been sold to Mountain 
View Dairy and Moroni Feed. Before payment could be made 
First Security notified Mountain View and Moroni of its 
security interest and demanded payment. On Wright's counter-
claim on the basis of such notice, the Court held the no-
tice was proper and appropriate. 
Thirdly, there is no evidence to support any con-
clusion that the Bank was not within the exercise of its 
lawful rights to refuse payment on Globe's three checks. 
There has been no evidence that funds were in the account 
at the time the checks were presented for payment. In fact, 
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tlie e:idence is that credits given for the final three leases 
negotiated with the Bank were reversed in order to utilize 
a different fund advancement procedure. (Tr Vol. 2 at 107 
and 130) Further, there is no evidence nor any legal reason 
in tne record to preclude the Bank from adopting an alternate 
mode for advancing funds to Globe on approved leases and act-
ing in accord with its determination to adopt that alternative. 
Mr. Weigelt testified that he discussed alternative methods 
for advancing funds to Globe in one of his original meetings 
with Bank officers. (Tr Vol. l at 10) 
C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT ANY INJURY TO THE APPELLEE, IF ANY, WAS THE 
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE ACTIONS OF THE APPELLANT. 
Even assuming that the actions of the Bank in ter-
minating Globe's credit, sending notices to lessees, and re-
fusing payment on three checks drawn by Globe somehow satis-
fy one of the elements of the alleged tort of interfering 
with business relationships, there is absolutely no evidence 
to show that such actions "caused" any interference with 
Globe's business relations, past, present, future, con-
tractual, or otherwise. It is fundamental that there must 
be a 0howing of interference with some business relationship 
caused by Bank's actions before liability can be found. To 
prope:cly evaluate Globe's claim of tortious interference, 
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it is helpful to delineate the parties with whom Globe 
either had or anticipated having business relationships. 
Such parties would be fully included in the following list-
ing: 
1. Financial institutions, including banks; 
2. Current and prospective lessees; 
3. Automobile dealers from whom car purchases 
were and would be made. 
Taking these groups in reverse order, consider 
first "automobile dealers." There is absolutely no evidence 
that Globe's ability to purchase automobiles from relevant 
dealers was in any way diminished. Notwithstanding the dis-
honor of checks drawn to the order of three particular 
dealers, there is no evidence that they refused to do fur-
ther business with Globe. In fact, the evidence shows 
that the three purchases were ultimately consummated on 
checks drawn by Globe. Further, the evidence is that Globe's 
credit reputation with such dealers was not very good in a~ 
event. (Tr Vol. 1 at 128-129) The three dealers took the 
checks from Globe directly to the Bank to be cashed. As 
Mr. Weigelt testified, that was highly unusual and indicated 
some doubt, prior to knowledge of the actions of the Bank, 
about the creditworthiness of Globe. 
Second, as to current and prospective lessees, it 
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's 
:,as alieady been pointed out there is no evidence that any 
lessee lll:cached a contract with Globe as a result of the 
Bank's actions. There is also a lack of substantial evi-
dence to support any conclusion that the Bank's notice 
caused either current lessees or prospective lessees to re-
frain from doing further business with Globe. There is, 
however, evidence in letters (Exhibit 22-P) that certain of 
the lessees were confused about the payment notices sent by 
the Bank and threatened to cease ref erring others to Globe 
or to do future business with Globe. As is clearly evi-
denced by those letters, however, that confusion and any 
negative impact which the notice of assignment had upon the 
lessees' regard for Globe were the result of either their 
failure to understand the clear language of their lease 
agreements or some representation by Globe's Mr. Weigelt 
that, notwithstanding such language, he would not assign the 
leases. Paragraph 13 of each lease explicitly grants to 
Globe the right to assign without notice. (Exhibit 17-P) 
Fault, therefore, cannot be placed with the Bank. There is 
no showing that lessees ceased doing business with Globe nor 
is there any showing of actual damages as a result of the 
notices. 
Finally, with respect to other financial institu-
tions, there is no evidence to indicate that any action of 
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the Bank, taken singly or in the aggregate, interfered with 
Globe's relationship, present or prospective, with such in-
stitutions. The only existing relationship, outside of thdt 
with Appellant Bank, was with Valley Bank & Trust Co. There 
is no evidence showing that Valley Bank refused financing or 
further dealings with Globe because of the acts of the Ap-
pellant Bank. Mr. Weigelt testified that he "thought" that 
he had spoken with Mr. Benson at Valley subsequent to the 
events which precipitated this lawsuit. (Tr Vol. 1 at 72) 
Mr. Benson's unequivocal testimony, however, was that no con· 
tact for lease financing was made with Valley after "ear~" 
197 4. (Tr Vol. 2 at 162) 
The evidence, with nothing to the contrary, is 
also that no bank except Appellant would finance Globe 
prior to the July, 1974 events. The uncontroverted evidence 
is also that no bank including Appellant would finance 
Globe's operations after the events of July, 1974. To show 
that the Appellant Bank interfered with any prospective ad-
vantage with these other banks, there must be some evidence 
that something of significance after Globe's initial ap-
proach had occurred which would have made the initial re-
fusals of those banks turn into acceptances of the financi~ 
package. In other words, there must be substantial evidence 
in the record to show that but for the Bank's actions in 
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iuly -ii -;_974, other banks would have agreed to assume financ-
ing. There simply is no such evidence. 
The testimony of Mr. Frank Stuart, an alleged ex-
pert witness on leasing and damages, was to the effect that 
tts~e was no way that Globe could have continued in business 
after July, 1974 because the crucial consideration was •cash 
flow" which was absent because of the Bank's actions. (Tr 
Vol. 1 at 209) That evidence is without any substantial 
value since Mr. Stuart also testified that in the absence of 
any cash flow he would have as a banking expert rec• nded 
credit extension because of Globe's •track record.•;!/ (Tr 
Vol. l at 220) The evidence, then, is that the absence of 
cash flow, though a consideration in determining credit-
worthiness would not, in the opinion of a banking expert, 
have caused the inability of Globe to obtain credit. 
Mr. Stuart's testimony was to that effect be-
cause Globe's track record was a strong •plus.• (Tr Vol. 
l at 235-241) In other words, if be bad been a banker in 
the period of time immediately following the events of 
July, 1974, he would have extended credit to Globe. lllo 
bank did, in fact, extend credit to Globe at that ti.lie and 
Y In substance, Mr. Stuart testified that his negative 
assessment of Globe as a marginal operation was chanqed be-
cause of t:be proven ability to generate leases •which ap-
peared 'n r-he surface to be good.• 
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under those circumstances. Globe would draw from the 
juxtaposition of that fact and Mr. Stuart's opinion that 
some other factor, hopefully attributable to some wrongful 
act or acts of the Bank caused the unfavorable results on 
the applications for credit which Globe made at that time. 
The only other unfavorable factor attributable to 
the Bank's actions which could account for the denial of 
credit would be some disparagement of Globe's credit. As 
has already been emphasized in this breif, the court made 00 
finding that such disparagement occurred (i.e., no false 
statements about Globe's creditworthiness) and could not 
make such a finding because all evidence was to the con-
trary (i.e., that Globe was not creditworthy). Even if 
any innuendo concerning Globe's credit arose from the Bank's 
conduct, there is no substantial evidence that banks re-
fused credit to Globe for that reason. Mr. Weigelt testi-
fied that he only encountered common knowledge of the "Bank 
of Salt Lake matter" at two of the seven or eight banks at 
which he made credit application. (Tr Vol. 1 at 72-73) 
There is no evidence by Mr. Weigelt or any other witness 
as to whether or not the "Bank of Salt Lake matter" was t~ 
reason that those two banks or any bank refused an extension 
of credit. Other evidence in the record is to the contracy. 
When Mr. Stuart was questioned as a banking expert as to 
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what neqative effect on Globe's credit, instances of double 
fina11cing, assignment of a forged lease, and leases to 
Leisureamerica would have, he indicated that the track 
record of Globe would justify continued financing. (Tr Vol. 
1 at 235-241) That evidence would suggest that some factor 
not attributable to the Bank's acts was the reason for the 
denial of Globe's credit applications after July of 1974. 
As the testimony of Larry Benson indicates, the reason 
for such denials may have been, as it was in the case of 
Valley Bank, because the banks were simply not interested 
in financing that kind of operation. (Tr Vol. 2 at 170) 
In fact Valley Bank's denial of credit in "early" 1974 to 
Globe notwithstanding its "track record" and no problems 
with Bank, suggests strongly that the banking community 
was simply not interested. 
III. 
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED ON LOST PROFITS WAS 
ERRONEOUS AS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AS APPLIED TO 
THIS CASE. 
"The basic and general rule is that 
loss of anticipated profits of a business 
venture involve so many factors of uncer-
tainty that ordinarily profits to be 
realized in the future are too speculative 
to base an award of damages thereon." 
Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 187, 515 P.2d 442 
(1973). Conversely, the court said: 
-".11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The other side of the coin is that damages 
to a business or enterprise need only be 
proved with sufficient certainty that 
reasonable minds might believe from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the damages 
were actually suffered. 
Id. at 187. Under this general rule, an award of damages 
measured by lost profits was erroneous because highly 
speculative and conjectural. 
As has already been argued, the "finding of fact" 
by the trial court that the actions of the Bank caused 
damage to Globe is insufficient because it does not ade-
quately address issues of fact presented at trial as to how 
the Bank's actions became the cause of those damages. The 
ambiguity and inadequacy of the finding is magnified by an 
attempt to specify whether the damages measured by lost 
profits were sustained by reason of a termination of the 
business allegedly caused by the Bank or a diminution of 
the business of Globe, the actual termination being the 
consequence of factors independent of the alleged wrong-
doing of the Bank. 
If the trial court awarded damages measured by 
lost profits for a diminution of the business of Globe 
caused by the wrongdoing of the Bank, the award must be re-
versed for an absolute absence of any evidence or findings 
of fact to support such a conclusion. There was no evi-
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dence at trial indicating the extent of any such diminution 
and an award of lost profits so based would be totally arbi-
trary and based upon the speculation of the trial judge. 
Under a second theory, as argued by counsel for 
Globe, the award of damages measured by lost profits is 
based upon the conclusion that the Bank's actions caused a 
wrongful termination of the business of Globe. We speculate 
that the trial court based its award upon that theory. Under 
that theory evidence was submitted to the court via the ex-
pert testimony of Mr. Stuart to establish the amount of such 
lost profits. Under the general rule expressed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Howarth, supra, no award of damages should 
have been made for a number of reasons. 
A. NO AWARD UNDER NEW BUSINESS RULE 
In the first place, the evidence before the court 
shows Globe to be a new business having actually operated 
for only one year. The general rule for awarding damages 
in the form of lost profits is given an added dimension of 
restrictiveness and caution when applied to new businesses. 
This Court in an opinion which would be considered dicta!! 
when applied to the facts of the case in which it was stated, 
Y That the ''new business" rule quoted by the court is well-
establ ishcd and accepted is amply evidenced by its reitera-
tion in 22 Am Jur 2d §173 at 245; 25 Corp. Jur. Sec. §42 at 
741; C. T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages, §29 
at 197 (1931): 64 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 319 (1950). 
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albeit stated in a manner suggesting a strong disposition to 
adopt the 
Sales Co. 
366, 367 
broader principle enunciated, quoted from Carolen 
-----..! 
v. Canyon Milk Products Co., 122 Wash 220, 210 P. 
(1922) as follows: 
[B]efore special damages for loss of 
profits to a general business occasioned by 
the wrongful acts of another may be recovered 
it must be made to appear that the business ' 
had been in successful operation for such a 
period of time as to give it permanency and 
recognition, and that such business was earn-
ing a profit which could be reasonably ascer-
tained and approximated. (Emphasis added.) 
Jenkins v. Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532, 535 (1953). 
I -2 C 
Accord, Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58, -itz-o P.2d 611, 618 
(1941). 
The application of the Carolene Sales rule is but 
another safeguard against the award of speculative damages. 
The imposition of the requirements of "permanency" and 
"recognition" is but a shorthand method of insuring that 
many of the uncertainties and contingencies associated wiili 
the successful operation of a business have been eliminated. 
Applying the Carolene Sales criteria to Globe, il 
is evident that not only should an award of future profits 
have been denied, but any evidence concerning the same shoulc 
have been excluded pursuant to the motion of the Bank's 
counsel at trial. With regard to the permanency of the 
business of Globe, there is no substantial or credible evi· 
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dence in the record to show permanency of the operation. 
f\11 indicutions are to the contrary. There is undisputed 
evidence of bad credit practices which were not merely un-
sound in a business sense, but fraudulent. The two speci-
f.Le i11stances of significance were the Hildreth leases, one 
of which was forged, and the double financing of a lease 
with Bank and Valley Bank. There is no inference of perma-
nence to be drawn from those facts for a company which en-
gages in such practices. 
It might be argued that the large number of leases 
generated by the company over a very short period of time 
is evidence of permanence. However, there is no credible 
evidence in the record which would support the profitability 
of those leases or continuation of those customers. In 
fact, the evidence as concerns a random sampling of leases 
generated by Globe shows a net loss both due to faulty cal-
culation of residuals and due to the lack of creditworthi-
ness of the leases. (Tr Vol. 2 at 173-178) The testimony of 
Mr. Stuart concerning those leases was not, with the exception 
la of the problem leases to Leisurearnerica, based upon his ap-
praisal of the soundness of any of the particular lessees' 
credit. (Tr Vol. 1 at 212) Mr. Stuart's testimony was that 
he felt the leases were sound credit-wise because the Bank's 
[Jrint,Jnt showed timely payment from Globe to the Bank. (Tr 
-35-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Vol. 1 at 212-213) However, the conclusion was based upon 
the erroneous assumption that there were no lease prepayments 
which would allow Globe's payments to the Bank to be current 
while some of the lessee's payments to Globe were not. (~ 
Vol. 1 at 223-224) Mr. Stuart's calculations with respect 
to those leases were premised upon his experience with leasinc 
operations, large and successful, and operated as an adjunct 
to automobile dealerships. (Tr Vol. 1 at 159-161, 189) 
There is nothing in the evidence, except Mr. Stuart's testi-
mony of Globe's high rate of generating leases, to show any 
analogy whatsoever between the leasing operations upon 
which Mr. Stuart based his expertise and Globe's actual 
operations. 
Additionally, there is substantial evidence in 
the record to show that there was little interest in the 
banking community for an auto leasing enterprise like Globe's. 
(Tr Vol. 1 at 122-123; Vol. 2 at 170) Reliance on one ba~ 
with a relatively low lending limit, both in terms of com-
mon business sense and legal requirements, does not suggest 
permanency at all. 
Finally, the fact that the termination of the one 
line of credit established could result in the demise of 
the business suggests both lack of permanency and recogni-
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tion, notwithstanding any negative reflections upon Globe's 
credit which may have resulted from the Bank's actions. In-
deed, the negative reflections on credit occasioned by the 
Bank's action should have been substantially discounted by 
bar.kers according to Mr. Stuart. As previously noted here-
in, he testified that double financing, a forged lease, and 
a series of bad leases to one company would not really 
bother him in the face of Globe's stellar performance, 
supra. He also, as earlier indicated, testified that track 
record, as opposed to existence of present cash flow, is the 
determinative factor in extending credit. All this would 
suggest that Mr. Stuart's assessment of the permanence and 
recognition of Globe was overstated since no bank with the 
same or greater expertise as Mr. Stuart advanced funds in 
reliance thereon. 
B. NO AWARD BECAUSE ALL LOST PROFIT WAS SPECULATIVE ON 
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. 
Even if Globe managed to satisfy the Carolene 
Sales test, lost profit damages would remain purely specu-
lative. In making his projections as to the profitability 
of Globe's operation, Mr. Stuart used a figure for bad 
debt based on "his experience with automobile leasing busi-
nesses" with which he had been associated. (Tr Vol. 1 at 
188) His later testimony was that the bad debt expense in 
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such companies and, therefore, also with his calculations 
for Globe, were very low. (Tr Vol. 1 at 194) There is 
nothing in the evidence to support a low bad debt allowance 
for Globe. Nothing in the evidence shows that Globe had, 
or ever would, operate in the same manner as the four, 
very well run, businesses upon which Mr. Stuart based his 
bad debt allowance for Globe. 
Based upon an estimate of bad debt reserve which 
is "very low," because derived from operations which were 
conducted by successful long-term leasing operations for 
which there is no evidence of comparability with Globe nor 
evidence that Globe did, could, or would "release" cars 
subject to repossession, Mr. Stuart calculated a net cash 
flow of $4, 800. 00. (Tr Vol. 1 at 189) He then used that data 
to calculate the lost profits to Globe. (Tr Vol. 1 at 214-
216) Without credible or reliable evidence as to what 
should have been the bad debt reserve for Globe's operation, 
any calculation of a loss of future profits is mere specula-
tion. 
A further reason for disallowing any award of 
damages as to loss of profits relates closely to the ques-
tion of permanency and recognition. Mr. Stuart made his 
calculation of lost profits on the basis of a ten-year 
period of continued business. Any estimation as to the 
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duration of Globe's operation absent the alleged wrong-doing 
of the Bank would be pure speculation and an award of 
damages based thereon would be in error. In Monter v. 
Kratzer, 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40, 43 (1972), it was held 
that: 
[A] judgment cannot be based upon mere specu-
lation. 
Where the loss is pecuniary and is present 
and can be measured but no sufficient evidence 
is given as to duration, or from which the 
duration, of time during which the damage will 
continue can be inferred, the jury, or the 
court sitting without a jury, can allow only 
nominal damages. (Emphasis added.) 
The facts in Kratzer on the question of duration present a 
striking similarity to the evidence in this case. In Kratzer 
the defendant counterclaimant was wrongfully evicted for one 
day from his bakery by the plaintiff. On that day Conti-
nental Baking Company was unable to obtain an order from 
defendant. Thereafter Continental did no further business 
with the defendant although it had previously placed orders 
with defendant for some 17 years. The trial court awarded 
damages to defendant on his counterclaim for profits lost 
as a result of Continental's termination. This Court re-
versed that award based upon the above principle of law. 
The evidence at trial was that Continental's business with 
defendant was 0n the decline and that there was a likeli-
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hood of termination in the very near future notwithstanding 
the wrong-doing of the plaintiff. 
This case is similar. The Bank may well have 
terminated financing at any point which it had the right to 
do. It could accept or reject any lease. Without another 
source of financing, and there is no credible evidence that 
any would have been available even absent any "wrong-doing" 
by the Bank, Globe may have been out of business a few months 
or a year later. The holding of Kratzer requires that on~ 
nominal damages, if any, be awarded. In another case, 
Gould v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 6 Utah 
2d 187, 309 P.2d 802 (1957) this court applied a fairly 
liberalized standard of certainty to a claim for lost profits 
arising from a failure by the defendant to properly list 
plaintiff in the telephone directory. After concluding 
that in those instances where it is clear that plaintiff 
has damaged defendant, liability should not be escaped be-
cause of uncertainty in the amount of damages resulting, 
this Court said: 
The rule remains, however, proof of loss 
of profits must not be completely speculative 
nor uncertain as to fact, although permissible 
as to measure or extent, and on the present 
state of proof it appears that the award for 
loss of prospective profits is wholly specu~ 
lative and cannot be allowed. The prospective 
profits were based on the speculative assump-
tion that the potential clients lost through 
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non-referral would have resulted in the 
referral of other clients or business by 
the clients presumably lost. 
Id. at 194. The parallel to this case is compelling. Globe 
has made absolutely no showing that it could have obtained 
alternate financing; and, certainly with the loan limit 
questions and questionable practices involved, there is 
nothing to show any reasonable expectancy of continued 
financing from the Bank. Gould also requires a denial of 
any damages for lost profits. 
C. THE MOTION OF THE BANK TO STRIKE MR. STUART'S TESTIMONY 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AT LEAST IN PART AS UNSUPPORTED 
BY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. THE FAILURE TO STRIKE 
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR AS TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED 
UPON LOST PROFITS, BECAUSE IT RESULTED IN THE COURT'S 
AWARD OF DAMAGES ON EVIDENCE NOT BEFORE IT. 
Fundamental to the opinions and calculations of 
Mr. Frank Stuart as to the future profits of Globe and its 
"track record" as a basis for credit extension, was his as-
sessment of the business as a whole, and of the unaudited 
financial statements and other accounting records of Globe 
in particular. In his step by step calculation of prof its 
for Globe, figures were taken directly from those account-
lng recor~s anct statements. (Tr Vol. 1 at 162-166) His 
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evaluation of the business as a whole and, therefore, his 
high opinion of its quality were based in part upon those 
same unaudited financial statements and records. His 
rather strong reluctance, while testifying in his role as 
an alleged expert banker, to discontinue or limit lending 
to Globe in the face of the fifteen bad credit risk 
Leisureamer ica leases, the double financing, a forged lease, 
and very thin capitalization, must have also been founded, 
as any banker's opinion would be, upon those accounting 
records and statements. (Tr Vol. 1 at 234-241) 
The court too had the opportunity to view those 
same accounting records and to attempt to draw therefrom 
findings of fact. (Exhibits 3-P; 4-P; 5-P) However, funda· 
mental to the interpretation and understanding of those 
accounting records were the preparing accountant's work-
ing papers. Mr. Stuart testified that he relied on those 
working papers to "assist in a total understanding of" 
those records. Yet, the working papers were not introduced 
into evidence and the court, therefore, could not possib~ 
have checked Mr. Stuart's understanding of the accounting 
records by referring to the working papers. Not only were 
Mr. Stuart's opinions, therefore not based totally upon 
matters in evidence; the conclusions of the court, if ba~d 
in any part upon those opinions, were also not based upon 
-42-
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~vidence pr0perly before the court and subject to cross-
exarnina tion. 
that: 
In that regard, this Court has ruled unequivocably 
In deciding a case tried without the 
aid of a jury, the court has great leeway 
in deciding what are the facts as presented 
by the evidence before him. However, 
neither a judge nor jury is permitted to 
go outside the evidence to make a finding. 
(Emphasis added.) 
salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Company, 29 Utah 
2d 409, 412, 503 P.2d 850, 852 (1972). In that case, the 
trial judge had made computations on the basis of a book 
which was never in evidence. Id. at 852. 
This case is not different. Here, in awarding 
damages, the trial judge concluded that the proper measure 
was "lost profits." (R. at 373-374) The only evidence and 
calculation as to the lost profits was presented by Mr. 
Stuart whose evaluations were based in part upon the total 
understanding of working papers not in evidence. There is 
no meaningful distinction to be drawn between reliance by 
a judge directly upon matters not in evidence or indirectly 
through the conclusions of an expert witness, to make dam-
age calculations. Accordingly, the damage award was in 
error. In the absence of either the working papers, them-
s~lves, 1 '.": opinions and calculations of Mr. Stuart 
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based thereon - such opinions and testimony were before the 
court by reason of a denial of the Bank's motion to strike 
the same - no credible evidence of Globe's profitability 
was before the court and no calculation of lost profits, 
except upon pure speculation, could have been made. 
IV. 
THERE ARE NO FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT APPELLEE 
SUFFERED DAMAGES MEASURED BY LOST PROFIT IN 
THE SUM OF FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50,000.00). 
A dominant theme of this appeal is the inadequacy 
of the findings of fact (and lack of evidence therefor) 
entered by the trial court in supposed support of the con-
clusions of law. A highly contested issue of fact in this 
case was the amount, if any, and measure of damages to be 
awarded if liability was found against the Bank. The issue 
was a rather complex one based upon rather sophisticated 
economic and business calculations and projections. Yet, 
the court in awarding damages in the amount of $50,000.00 
"for lost profits" did not enter a finding of fact as to 
what could reasonably have been the expected duration of 
Globe's operation at a profit or the amount of the profit. 
Nor did the court enter a fi~ding of fact on the well-de-
bated issue of whether or not Globe's operation was, or 
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. . f" k" 5/ c.cven ,,,uu _1<) t~c, a pro it-ma ing venture. - Further, the 
ficJure o:- $50, 000. 00 for lost profits bears not even the 
slightest resemblance to any evidence presented to the 
court on che issue and is merely a gross invention pro-
ducecd by some unknown method of judicial legerdemain. 
There was an absence of specific fact findings on 
material issues which would support the figure advanced by 
the court. The holding in Legrand Johnson Corp. v. Peter-
son, supra, was designed to avoid such results. 
v. 
THE DISMISSAL OF ALL COUNTERCLAIMS OF THE 
APPELLANT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF 
FACT MADE BY THE COURT OR BY EVIDENCE IN 
THE RECORD AND SHOULD THEREFORE, BE REVERSED. 
The undisputed evidence at trial was that Globe as-
signed to the Bank a lease with the forged signature of the 
purported lessee, Donald Hildreth. Said lease was assigned 
to the Bank in consideration of a sum of $8,546.41 advanced 
to Globe. (Tr Vol. 1 at 89) The uncontroverted evidence 
was also that Globe had previously executed a valid lease 
with said Donald Hildreth, which lease contained terms com-
pletely at variance with the forged lease which was assigned 
to the Bank. (Tr Vol. 1 at 90-104; Exhibit 29-D) The ori-
21 In fact, the unaudited financials of Globe, without any 
expert interpretation and reworking, show actual operating 
losses for Globe for the first year. (Tr Vol. 1 at 135 and 
Exhibi t'i }- P, 4-P and 5-P) 
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ginal and valid lease executed by said Donald Hildreth was 
shown by the evidence to have been prepaid in full in ad-
vance and that the Bank suffered damage as a result of ~~ 
fraudulent action in the amount of Three Thousand One Hun-
dred Eleven Dollars ($3,111.00). (Tr Vol. 2 at 197) The 
uncontroverted evidence that was introduced at trial showed 
the forged document to have been totally within the control 
of Globe's only two officers, Mr. and Mrs. Weigelt. 
There was also undisputed evidence at trial that, 
contrary to express representations made in a security agree· 
ment with the Bank and, upon which the Bank relied in ad-
vancing funds for the assignment of the motor vehicle lease 
of a 1974 Pontiac, No. 0701-01-01, Mr. Weigelt, as President 
of Globe, had obtained a loan previously from Valley Bank& 
Trust Company and had given a security interest in that 
same automobile. (Tr Vol. 1 at 111) The further uncontro-
verted evidence at trial was that the Bank was damaged in 
the sum of Three Thousand One Hundred Sixty Five and 95/100 
Dollars ($3,165.95) incurred in making good the represe~~ 
tion of Globe that no such prior security interest exist~. 
(Tr Vol. 2 at 160) 
Despite the presence of such uncontroverted evi-
dence in the record, the trial court made no findings of 
fact with respect to the above-described claims of the 
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6/ 
Bank. - .l\s has already been argued the failure to make such 
findings is reversible error. See Legrand Johnson Corp. v. 
Peterson, supra. 
Furthermore, the court not only failed to make 
spc::,ific findings of fact as to those two claims of the Bank, 
it concluded, without any evidence in support thereof, that 
the counterclaims of the Bank should be dismissed. In para-
graph 12 of the findings of fact, the court found that 
"factually the defendant Bank of Salt Lake's Counterclaim 
should be dismissed." In paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of 
Law, the court states: 
The Counterclaim of the Bank of Salt Lake 
having been considered in determining Globe 
Leasing's damages should be dismissed. 
(R. at 371-374) Both statements are totally inexplicable 
either on the basis of the court's fact findings or, more 
so, on the basis of the evidence at trial. 
Neither Mr. or Mrs. Weigelt ever denied that the 
~ The substance of the claim on the Hildreth lease was 
pleaded in the counterclaim as filed with the court. (R. 
at 39) As for the claim of the Bank for double financing 
of the 1974 Pontiac, in a stipulation between the Bank and 
Mr. Weigelt, Globe's principal owner and officer, which 
stipulation was entered in the bankruptcy proceedings of 
Mr. Weigelt, it was agreed that this claim was one which 
would be adjudicated in the trial proceedings in this case. 
Although the record shows no formal amendment to include 
this claim jn the original counterclaim, the proof of the 
claim was introduced at trial without objection by Globe's 
counsel (P. at 350-351) 
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second Hildreth lease was forged. Mrs. Weigelt simply dis-
claimed knowledge of how the forgery came about. (Tr Vol, 
1 at 269-270) The line of questioning employed by counsel 
for Globe suggested that the explanation was that Mr. Hil-
dreth authorized Mr. Weigelt to sign on his behalf. The un-
contested testimony of Mr. Hildreth was that he had never 
given such authorization. (Tr Vol. 1 at 152) 
Nor was there any denial of the fact of the do~~ 
financing on the '74 Pontiac lease. Indeed, there was no 
denial of responsibility therefor. Mr. Weigelt simply at-
tempted to explain the matter away as administrative over-
sight. (Tr Vol. 1 at 112-114, 136-137) Oversight or fraud, 
the damage was done. On either theory, the problem hardly 
supports the opinion testimony offered by Mr. Stuart that 
Globe was an efficient, well-run, successful business. 
In the face of such clear evidence with nothi~~ 
substance to the contrary, the dismissal of all of the Bank': 
counterclaims must be reversed and judgment entered in the 
sums claimed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the Appellant 
Commercial Security Bank of Salt Lake is entitled to a 
judgment by this Court reversing the judgment of liabili~ 
and award of damages made on behalf of the Appellee by the 
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tn.al court. Further, from the foregoing, Appellant is 
entitled to a reversal of the trial court's dismissal of 
its counterclaims, an entry of judgment on its behalf and 
an award of the appropriate damages. 
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